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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the stabilisation properties of distortionary taxes in a New Keynesian
model with overlapping generations of finitely-lived consumers. In this framework, government
debt is part of net wealth and this adds a number of interesting channels through which fiscal
policy could affect output and inflation. Output volatility, in presence of technology shocks, is not
substantially affected by the operation of automatic stabilisers but we find interesting composition
effects. While the presence of finitely-lived households strengthens the stabilisation performance
of distortionary taxes through the reduction of the volatility of consumption, it does so at the cost
of more volatile investment and real balances. These conflicting responses add up to a very small
overall welfare losses associated with distortionary taxation.
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1. Introduction
Until recently, work on the trade-off between output and inflation variability in the con-
text of New Keynesian economies subject to supply shocks has tended to downplay the
role of fiscal policy in defining that trade-off (see Clarida et al.,1999, for example). The
implicit reasons for ignoring fiscal policy in defining the trade-off are that the economies
modelled were typically populated by infinitely-lived economic agents such that, pro-
vided the government implemented a “passive” fiscal policy through lump-sum taxation
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(Leeper, 1991) monetary policy was free to minimise the distortions generated by nominal
inertia. However, a number of recent papers are now attempting to define the optimal
combinations of monetary and fiscal policies in economies where taxation is distortionary
(see, for example, Benigno and Woodford, 2003, Benassy, 2003, or Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2002). There has also been some analysis of the impact of fiscal policy on the
inflation-output trade-off facing monetary policy makers. For example, Galí (1994) finds,
in the context of a real business cycle model, that automatic stabilisers may increase out-
put volatility, while Andrés and Doménech (2003) find that such results can be overturned
if the economy is subject to significant real and nominal rigidities.
In the current paper we assess the stabilisation potential of distortionary taxation
using a model which departs from previous work in a crucial respect: we relax the
assumption of infinitely lived consumers. Specifically, in section 2 we develop a model
where overlapping generations of consumers, facing a probability of death, supply labour
to imperfectly competitive firms. These firms produce differentiated products using this
labour and capital (which is subject to capital adjustment costs). In setting their prices
firms are also constrained by Calvo contracts, such that they can only change prices after
random intervals of time. There are numerous sources of distortionary taxation in the
model: labour income, consumption and profits taxes all affect the decisions made by
economic agents within the economy.
The presence of non-Ricardian consumers adds to the canonical model at least two
channels that can be relevant for fiscal policy analysis. Firstly, a positive probability of
death makes aggregate consumption dynamics dependent on the amount of outstanding
debt. Secondly, the steady-state real interest rate increases with the stock of debt. These
features are likely to affect the performance of automatic stabilisers since both impinge
upon the cyclical response of consumption and investment to technology shocks. Thus,
we look at the incidence of distortionary taxation on the components of aggregate de-
mand as well as on leisure and real balances. Furthermore, as a means of obtaining a
measure of the overall performance of automatic stabilisers we compute their contribution
to (reducing) the welfare cost of technology-driven fluctuations.
A key result of the paper, presented in section 3, is that, relative to an economy
without distortionary taxation, introducing distortionary taxes and allowing automatic
stabilisers to function, can reduce the volatility of some components of demand, but raise
the relative volatility of others. Specifically, in economies with significant deviations from
Ricardian consumption behaviour and a large debt/GDP ratio, consumption volatility
can be reduced relative to an economy without distortionary taxes, while investment
expenditure is more volatile. The reason is that when debt is part of consumers' net wealth
the movements in government debt (partially induced by movements in real interest3
rates and therefore debt service costs) serve to offset the impact of real interest rate
movements on consumption. In contrast, the higher volatility in real rates that emerge
when consumers are not infinitely lived (consumers need greater compensation, cet. par.,
to hold a given stock of government debt when they are finitely lived) induces greater
fluctuations in investment expenditure.
Our welfare analysis, in section 4, suggests that, in general, the welfare cost of
fluctuations is higher when distortionary taxes are present and, therefore, the reduction
in the relative volatility of consumption does not compensate for the higher volatility of
labour and real balances in the economy with distortionary taxes. However, as the wealth
effect of government debt increases (either through less Ricardian behaviour on the part
of consumers or increases in the steady-state debt to GDP ratio), then the welfare costs
of shocks decrease and the difference between a lump-sum and distortionary-taxation
financed economy is less marked. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 Capital Rental Firms' Behaviour
We assume that there is a single representative firm accumulating capital for rental to
t h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d sf i r m s . 2 This firm seeks to maximise the discounted value of its
cashflows, which are then redistributed to households. Therefore the firm's objective
function is to maximise the following expression,
Vt =( 1− τk
t)pk










t is the real rental cost of capital, kt is the capital stock and et is real investment
expenditure. However, because of capital adjustment costs, only a fraction of investment,
Φ(et
kt)kt, is actually converted into capital, which also depreciates at rate δ.T h e r e f o r et h e




)kt +( 1− δ)kt (2)
2 The model solution as well as the log-linearized system describing the dynamics are contained
in a technical appendix available at http://iei.uv.es/~rdomenec/ADL/tech_appendix.pdf.4
The Lagrangian associated with this problem is given by,
Lt =( 1 − τk
t)pk
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t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the equation of motion for the capital
stock. Also, differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to kt+1 gives the equation of
























2.2 Price Setting: Nominal Inertia
If firms cannot change prices in every period then there is not a symmetric equilibrium
in which Pit = Pt. Instead, to facilitate aggregation, we follow Calvo's model of nominal
inertia (see Calvo, 1983): a percentage φ of firms set
Pit = πPit−1 (6)
whereas the rest of the firms (1−φ) select e Pit to maximize the value of their shares, that
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2.3 Capital and Labour Demand: Cost Minimization.
Once prices are set, demand is given by the downward sloping curve that each firm faces.
The optimal combination of capital and labour is obtained from the cost minimization
problem of the firm:




















Here we introduce the main departure from the canonical new-Keynesian model. While
there is abundant evidence of a strong interaction among fiscal impulses and output (see,
for example, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, or Fatas and Mihov, 1998), standard dynamic
general equilibrium models downplay the role of demand. The importance of the demand
side of the economy is partially restored when there is slow adjustment in nominal and
real variables, but still intertemporal substitution mechanisms and Ricardian equivalence
leave consumption largely unresponsive to a fiscal stimulus. Introducing a probability
of death implies that consumers discount their future disposable income more heavily,
such that the the usual Ricardian experiment of a deficit-financed tax cut now increases6
consumption. Let us describe in detail the environment in which households' decisions
take place.













holding real money balances, Mi
t/Pt and suffers disutility from supplying labour to










+ κln(1 − li
t+s) (16)
There are two sources of uncertainty in the model: consumers face a constant probability
of death (1 − γ), and the firms that employ them can only set their prices at stochastic
intervals. These sources of individual uncertainty can all be pooled so that there is no










+ κ ln(1 − li
t+z) (17)
Consumers seek to maximise utility subject to the demand schedule for their labour
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Here consumers earn after tax income from their labour services Pt(1−τw
t )wtli
t , receive









Pt and public transfers, Ptst . Households also hold their assets in two
forms: money, Mi
t , and government bonds, Bi
t . Money pays no interest, while bonds
earn interest at the rate it. It would be possible for consumers to invest in a portfolio of
equity holdings of intermediate goods firms and capital rental firms - in the case of the
intermediate goods producers this would also diversify the risk due to staggered price
setting and would affect the distribution of profits across consumers at different stages
in their life cycle. However, in aggregate, this does not matter, so, for simplicity, we7
assume a simple lump-sum redistribution of aggregate profits. The gross nominal rate
of return on financial assets is given by 1+it, and competitive insurance companies
contract with individuals to receive their financial wealth should they die in return for
a insurance premium equal to the probability of death -this raises the effective rate of
interest to 1+it



















































































Integrating the flow budget constraint forwards and imposing the no-Ponzi Game con-











where 1+rt ≡ (1 + it)/πt+1 i st h ee xp o s tr e a lr a t eo fr e t u r no nf i n a n c i a la s s e t s .
Maximising utility subject to this intertemporal budget constraint yields the fol-
lowing first order conditions. Firstly for consumption,
(1 + τc
t+z)ci





(1 + rt+j−1) (25)8
where λi is the Langrange multiplier associated with the intertemporal budget constraint
in the consumer's optimisation. This expression can be used to derive the individual
consumer's consumption Euler equation,
(1 + τc
t+z)ci





(1 + rt+j−1) (26)





































2.5 Aggregating across Consumers and Consumption Dynamics.
If the size of each cohort when born is 1, then the size of a cohort of age i is given by,







It is therefore possible to aggregate across consumers different generations to generate


















In this simple closed economy model net financial assets will correspond with government
debt.
Aggregating consumers' labour supply yields,
(1 − τw
t )wt(1 − lt)=κ(1 + τc
t)ct (33)








where all variables are now in per capita terms.
Finally, from the aggregate consumption function and using the government bud-
get constraint, after some algebra (see the Appendix) we obtain the dynamics for aggre-



















This expression summarizes the two main changes that a model with finitely-lived
agents opens up for fiscal policy. For one thing, when consumers have finite lives, γ < 1,
Ricardian equivalence breaks down and government debt affects the path of aggregate
consumption. Additionally, since non-Ricardian consumers require a higher real interest
rates to be prepapred to hold higher levels of government debt, cet par,f l u c t u a t i o n si n
government debt also affect the real interest rate in general equilibrium thereby influenc-
ing the cyclical response of consumption, investment and hours to technology shocks.
2.6 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Monetary and fiscal policy is modeled as in Andrés and Doménech (2003). In particular,
monetary policy is represented by a standard Taylor rule:
it = ρrit−1 +( 1− ρr)i +( 1− ρr)ρπ(πt − π)+( 1− ρr)ρyb yt + zi
t (36)
in which the monetary authority sets the interest rate (it) to prevent inflation deviating
from its steady-state level (πt − π) and to counteract movements in the output gap (b yt);
i i st h es t e a d y - s t a t ei n t e r e s tr a t ea n dt h ec u r r e n tr a t em o v e ss m o o t h l y( 0 < ρr < 1)a n d
has an unexpected component, zi
t.
Provided that ρπ is above a certain threshold value, fiscal policy must be designed
to satisfy the present value budget constraint of the public sector for any price level in10
order to obtain a unique monetary equilibrium (Leeper, 1991, Woodford, 1996, Leith and
Wren-Lewis, 2000). A simple way of making this requirement operational is to assume
that either taxes or public spending respond sufficiently to the level of debt. We use
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, αb,αy ≥ 0 (37)
where the bar over the variables indicates steady-state values.
2.7 Calibration
In order to analyse the main implications of our model, we have obtained a numerical
solution of the steady state as well as of the log-linearized system. Table 1 summarizes
the values of the calibrated baseline parameters. Most of them are taken from Andrés and
Doménech (2003) and are similar to other DGE models as, for example, the parameters
of the production function, the Taylor rule or the Phillips curve. However, since some
parameters are specific to our model, they should be calibrated. Thus, χ has been chosen
to match the ratio of M1 to quarterly GDP in EMU, using data from 2002, when this ratio
was 1.37. Parameter κ was set to1.28 s i n c ew ea s s u m et h a ti nt h es t e a d ys t a t eh o u s e h o l d s
allocate 0.31 of their time to market activities, as in Cooley and Prescott (1995). Under the
assumption that the consolidation of public debt to the target b/y =2 .4 (i.e., a annual debt
to GDP ratio of 60 per cent) is made only through transfers (αs




0.0) and that γ =0 .995 (implying an expected adult life of 50 years), the simulated model
reproduces the most salient facts of European business cycles which appear in Table 2
as, for example, the relative volatility of consumption (σc/σy), investment (σe/σy) or
correlation between the primary budget surplus and output (σpbs,y). The model also
yields close values of the private consumption and investment to GDP ratios in steady
state to the average values observed in EMU from 1960 to 1999.3
The model with supply shocks has been simulated 100 times, producing 200 ob-
s e r v a t i o n s . W et a k et h el a s t100 observations and compute the steady-sate value (x),
the relative standard deviation to output (σx/σy,e x c e p tf o rG D Pw h i c hi sj u s tσy), the
first-order autocorrelation (ρx) and the contemporaneous correlation with output (ρxy)
of each variable. We have also simulated an economy with zero tax rates on consump-
3 Standard deviations have been taken from Agresti and Mojon (2001), using the HP filter. Con-
sumption and investment shares have been calculated using OECD Economic Outlook annual data
from 1960 to 1999. Finally, the cross correlation of the primary budget surplus and output refers
to EMU from 1970 to 2001.11
Table 1
Calibration of baseline model
χβγ α θδσ z ρz εκ Θ φ
0.0285 0.9926 0.995 0.40 0.10 0.021 0.874 0.80 6.0 0.20 -0.25 0.75




b ρr ρπ π κ
0.439 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.5 2.0 1.020.25 1.28
tion, labour and capital incomes, in which public spending is financed using a lump-sum
tax such that gs/y = −0.26, but with otherwise identical fiscal structure as that in the
benchmark model (gc/y =0 .18, gp/y =0 .06, b/y =0 .6).
We shall see below that output volatility is sensitive to the fiscal instrument used
to stabilise debt, the level of debt and the extent to which consumers discount the future
more heavily due to finite lives. Indeed the sensitivity of this result to these factors stems
from the fact that the introduction of finite lives consumers has very different impacts on
key components of aggregate demand. The volatility of consumption relative to output
will tend to be less in the non-lump-sum economy, while the volatility of investment will
be higher. The reason for this is that, in the presence of finite lives, the wealth effect
of government debt on consumption will tend to offset the effect of any movements in
real interest rates induced by changes in the outstanding stock of government liabilities.
With no such finite horizon effect operating on investment, the response of investment
to changes in interest rates is that much stronger.
3. Finite Horizons, Debt and Output Volatility
In this section we use the model in section 2 to assess the contribution to macroeconomic
stability of distortionary taxes. The statistic used to summarize our result is relative out-
put volatility, which is defined as the standard deviation of output in the economy with
distortionary taxes (σd
y) relative to the standard deviation in the economy with lump-sum
taxes (σl
y). In particular a ratio below one implies that distortionary taxes are functioning
as automatic stabilisers, in particular dampening the movements of disposable income in
response to technology shocks. Although it may seem natural for distortionary taxes to
have this effect Galí (1994) demonstrates, in the context of a real business cycle model,
that income taxes actually tend to magnify output volatility as compared with lump-sum
ones. The explanation of such a result can be found in the destabilizing effect that dis-
tortionary taxes generate in the use of productive factors, with a reduction of the steady
state value of capital and labour, thus magnifying the relative size of cyclical fluctua-
tions. Indeed, the RBC version of our model (Φ(e
k)=e
k, φ =0 , γ =1 )r e p r o d u c e st h a t
result with a ratio σd
y/σl
y =1 .2. Andrés and Doménech (2003) have shown that this ra-12
Table 2








tio is diminished in economies with substantial nominal and real frictions; the rationale
f o rt h i si st h a tt h o s ef r i c t i o n sg i v eam o r ei m p o r t a n tr o l et od e v e l o p m e n t so nt h ed e m a n d
side of the economy. When taxes are linked to consumption and income, countercycli-
cal movements on the aggregate demand interact with those on the supply side, helping




The aim of this section is to focus on the new dimension of the model introduced
by allowing consumers to behave in a non-Ricardian manner. In particular, we analyse
how the cyclical properties of the main variables are affected by the value of the survival
probability (γ)a n dt h ed e b tt oo u t p u tr a t i o( B/Y ). Strictly speaking only the value
of γ characterises the extent of non-Ricardian behaviour. Nevertheless, for non-zero
probability of death the steady-state stock of outstanding debt matters both because of its
direct effect on consumption and also because it influences the steady-state real rate of
interest. To isolate the effects of these changes in γ and in B/Y we consider a fiscal rule
only in transfers (i.e., αc
b = α
p
b =0 ), since the consolidation of public debt through public
consumption and/or investment may induce additional demand and supply impacts.
The first result to notice is summarized in Figure 1. Somewhat strikingly, relative
output volatility (σd
y/σl
y) seems to be immune to changes in either these two parameters.
Except for very low values of γ and high B/Y both tax structures generate a similar
volatility of output, although distortionary taxes seem to perform slightly better: relative
output volatility is lower than one. This unchanged ratio is the result of a common
pattern associated with both tax structures: as the non-Ricardian friction becomes larger,
the volatility of output decreases.
A closer look at the response of aggregate demand components reveals significant











































Figure 1: Relative volatility of output as a function of γ and B/GDP.
differences across them implying automatic stabilizers may have a far greater impact
than that measured by relative output volatility. This can be seen in Figure 2 which
represents how the relative volatility of the main variables varies across γ and B/Y .T h e
first thing to notice is that the relative volatility of investment, hours and real balances
is always greater than one, and so is that of private consumption for low values of the
debt to GDP ratios. This is not inconsistent with relative output volatility being less than
one and merely reflects a composition effect since the steady-state level of investment is
much greater in an economy without distortionary taxation.5 What is more remarkable
though is the divergent patterns that emerge as we depart from the world of Ricardian
c o n s u m e r s . A st h ed e b tt oG D Pr a t i oi n c r e a s e sa n dγ falls, the relative volatility of
investment rises sharply, even in the presence of significant capital adjustment costs.
T h er e a s o nf o rt h i sc a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e3w h i c hr e v e a l st h a tt h es t e a d y - s t a t e
interest rate level is much higher for low γ and high B/Y ,l e a d i n gt oal o w e rd e m a n d
for capital and, thus, to larger relative fluctuations in investment under distortionary
taxes. Hours worked are also affected in the same manner, since lower steady-state
5 Since the fiscal rule operates only through transfers, public consumption and investment are
constant, implying that their variances and covariances are zero. Figure 2 shows that for low




d. S i n c et h ec o v a r i a n c eb e t w e e np r i v a t ec o n s u m p t i o n
and investment are also higher in the economy with distortionary taxes, only the composition effect
can explain that σ(y)
d < σ(y)
l. We have checked that this is the case since the private investment
share is much larger in the economy with lump-sum taxes than in the economy with distortionary














































































Figure 2: Relative volatility of investment, consumption, hours and output as a
function of γ and B/GDP.
capital means less hours worked and hence stronger cyclical fluctuations.
These steady-state values have the opposite effect on consumption. As γ falls the
variance of consumption increases in both economies. This is consistent with the Euler
equation for consumption, because now the volatility of consumption is affected by the
volatility of wealth, as expression (35) makes clear. When γ =0consumption is affected
only by the expected path of real interest rates, but γ < 0 means that consumers are more
aware of changes in their current real wealth. However, the increase in the volatility of
consumption is more pronounced in the economy with lump-sum taxes, a result which
c a nb ee x p l a i n e db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h ec o e f f i c i e n to ft h ec h a n g e si nr e a lw e a l t hi nt h e
dynamic version of the Euler equation is a negative funtion of τc and the ratio of private



































































Figure 4: Minimun values of αs
b required for being in a regime with pasive fiscal
policy as a function of αs
y and B/Y.16
with distortionary taxation, it follows that the increase of the variance of consumption is
higher in the economy with lump-sum taxes.
The volatility of consumption, is also affected by another interesting feature of
t h en o n - R i c a r d i a nm o d e l .A st h es u r v i v a lr a t ef a l l st h ee l a s t i c i t yo ft r a n s f e r st ot h ed e b t
to GDP ratio (αb in the fiscal rule) needed to ensure a unique monetary equilibrium
increases. This increase is much larger as the steady state B/Y rises as Figure 4 shows.
High (low) debt (survival rate) is associated with high interest payments so that the fiscal
rule must be more aggressive in preventing deviations of the debt to GDP ratio from
target. Otherwise, following shocks, significant changes in the level of debt may prevent
convergence to the steady state. However, as the aggressiveness of the fiscal rule is
increased the ability of debt to reduce the volatiltity of consumption is reduced. 6
4. The Welfare Costs of Fluctuations
Given that the relative volatility of many macroeconomic aggregates varies in opposite
directions when the survival rate or the debt to output ratio changes, we need an appro-
priate metric to asses which situation among the different alternatives has grater impact
on households' welfare. In principle, the survival rate is exogenous in our model but
different levels of the debt to output ratio can be targeted. The natural solution to this
problem is to compare the expected utility of a representative agent in economies with
distortionary and lump-sum taxes with the expected utility in their respective steady
states. To do so we compute the proportional reduction in private consumption (ψ)i n
steady state needed to make an average consumer indifferent between being permanently






ln(1 − ψ)ct+z + χln
Mt+z
Pt+z











+ κ ln(1 − lt+z)
¾
such that ct+zrefers to the steady state aggregate consumption at time t + z.
6 However if α
b is increased in line with the minimal requirements of fiscal solvency as the
survival probability is reduced, then the stabilising effect on consumption volatility of increasing
the degree of non-Ricardian behaviour dominates the procyclical effect of a `tougher' fiscal rule.17
Table 3
Average consumer. ψ × 103
b/y
1.0 2.5 4.0
γψ d ψl ψd ψl ψd ψl
0.990 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.26
0.970 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.15
0.950 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10
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defines our measure of the welfare of different degrees of fiscal distortion. The proportion
of steady-state consumption that the average consumer will pay to eliminate shocks in a
lump-sum and distortionary economy is given in Table 3. The sensitivity of this relative
welfare measure to changes in the ratio of government debt to GDP and the degree of
non-Ricardian behaviour on the part of consumers is also detailed.
Consistently with the fact that volatilities are almost always higher in the econ-
omy with distortionary taxation, welfare is higher in the lump-sum economy. Even in
the case in which fiscal stabilisers are capable of delivering lower consumption volatility,
the welfare repercussions of higher real balances and labour volatilities under distor-
tionary taxation dominate such that welfare cost of technology shocks are higher in the
distortionary tax economy. Nevertheless, as the level of debt and probability of death are
increased, the welfare costs of shocks fall regardless of the tax structure and the welfare
differences across the two economies also falls.18
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a New Keynesian model with overlapping generations of
f i n i t e l y - l i v e dc o n s u m e r ss u c ht h a tg o v e r n m e n td e b ti sp a r to fn e tw e a l t h .T h i se x t e n d st h e
number of channels through which fiscal policy could affect real and nominal variables, as
compared with standard models with Ricardian consumers. Households supply labour to
imperfectly competitive firms who produce goods using this labour and physical capital.
To introduce a non-trivial role for monetary policy, prices set by firms are sticky in
the manner of Calvo (1983). Labour income, profits and consumption expenditure are
all subject to distortionary taxation, such that consumption, labour supply, pricing and
investment decisions are all affected by taxation. The government also spends resources
in consumption transfers and productive expenditures which affect productivity. As a
result the description of fiscal policy within our economy is very rich. We then calibrate
t h em o d e lt oc a p t u r et h em a i nb u s i n e s sc y c l es t y l i s e df a c t sf o rt h eE u r o p e a ne c o n o m i e s
and assess the role of automatic stabilisers in affecting the volatility of the key components
of aggregate demand.
We find that, the presence of finitely-lived households increases the automatic
stabilization of distortionary taxes through the reduction of the volatility of consumption
in the face of technology shocks, but at the cost of increasing the volatility of investment
and labour supply. The net impact on volatility depends crucially on the size of the
outstanding stock of government debt and the extent to which consumer behaviour is
non-Ricardian. Typically, such a wealth effect will tend to reduce consumption variability,
with repercussions for movements in labour supply. However, when the outstanding
stock of debt is relatively high, then the volatility in investment expenditures in the
presence of distortionary taxation is so great that it dominates the stabilising impact on
consumption. We then draw out the welfare implications of this analysis, by looking
at the utility of the average consumer. We find that, in general the welfare cost of
fluctuations is higher when distortionary taxes are present and, therefore, the reduction
in the relative volatility of consumption does not compensate for the high volatility of
labour supply and real balances. However, as the wealth effect of government debt
increases (either through less Ricardian behaviour on the part of consumers or increases
in the steady-state debt to GDP ratio), then the welfare costs of shocks decrease and
the difference between a lump-sum and distortionary-taxation financed economy is less
marked.
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